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El Banco de Barcelona fue el primer banco emisor regional en España. Gracias a la reciente 
recuperación del archivo del B anco de Barcelona, analizamos los ratios contables de solvencia, liquidez y 
rentabilidad para el periodo 1844-1856. 
El análisis de los ratios contables muestra que el Banco de Barcelona elevó el grado de apalancamiento 
financiero. La rentabilidad del accionista se incrementó pero la solvencia y la liquidez se redujeron tras la crisis 
financiera de 1847-1848. 
En los orígenes del sistema financiero, cuando no había un sistema rígido de control legal sobre la 





The Bank of Barcelona was the first regional issuing bank in Spain. Thanks to the recent recovery of the 
Bank of Barcelona archive, we have analysed accounting ratios of solvency, liquidity and profitability in the 
1844-1856 period. 
The analysis of the accounting ratios shows that the Bank of Barcelona increased its level of financial 
leverage. Shareholder profitability increased but solvency and liquidity showed a declining trend after the 
financial crisis of 1847-48.  In the beginning of the banking system, when strict governmental control was 
lacking, shareholder profitability took priority over the other business aims such as solvency and liquidity. 
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Barcelona was one of the pioneering Spanish c ities in the establishment of issuing 
banking institutions in the mid-19
th century. The Bank of Barcelona was set up in 1844 and 
closed down in 1920 after a much-publicized bankruptcy process. 
Banking practices implemented by the Bank of Barcelona modernized Catalan finance 
in the mid-19
th century. Spanish legislation restricted the creation of issuing banks until the 
banking liberalization Act of 1856 and, as a result, the Bank of Barcelona did not have any 
competition in Catalonia during the years 1844-1856. The aim of our study was to understand 
the logic of banking activity during this period. 
The paper analyses accounting ratios of solvency, liquidity and profitability of the 
Bank of Barcelona in the 1844-1856 period. Our methodology is close to the definition 
formulated by Cañibano Calvo (quoted by Hernández Esteve, 2003:15), who emphasizes the 
informative purposes of accounting:  “Accounting is an economic science, the purpose of 
which is past, present and future knowledge of the economic reality in quantitative terms at 
all its organizational levels, by means of specific methods supported by bases that have been 
sufficiently verified, in order to draw up information that covers external financial needs and 
internal planning and control requirements”. As a private institution, the Bank of Barcelona 
developed a banking policy focusing on business criteria. 
The literature has primarily addressed the standardization of bank balance sheets for 
subsequent phases (after 1856). The most ambitious study was the 2 -volume work published 
by the Bank of Spain and coordinated by Gabriel Tortella (1974), La banca española en la 
Restauración. For our study, we used the accounting criteria of today to thoroughly 
standardize the balance sheets of Bank of Barcelona in a period in which there were few 
banks in Spain. With this aim in mind we tabulated data provided by the institution in its half-
yearly reports and presented it in systematic accounts. By presenting the bank’s accounts in a 
contemporary arrangement that respects and explains the special features, we offer 
researchers a source of first-hand information that can be used in subsequent works. The 
accounting methodology provides insight into the institution’s business management. Our 
study provides a firmer grasp of  the institution’s decision-making process and the importance 
of these decisions on the economic development of Catalonia. An accounting analysis of the 
objectives of liquidity, solvency and profitability is relevant in order to understand the 
microeconomic workings of the bank. 
The paper is organized in four sections. First of all, we describe the historiography of 
issuing banks in Spain in the 19
th century and the legal framework of the accounting system. 
Secondly, we study the origin and the organizational structure of the Bank of Barcelona. The 
items that we included in the standardized accounts balances are then discussed next. Finally, 
we analyse the bank’s accountant ratios of solvency, liquidity and profitability. Thanks to the 
recent recovery of the Bank of Barcelona archive, our paper helps us understand the business 
of a modern pioneering bank in Spain. 
 
The history of Spanish banking and bookkeeping  
In the modern period, Spain developed important skills in banking practice as a result 
of the management of money from its South American colonies (Ruiz Martín, 1970). After 
these colonies became independent,  financial difficulties led to the bankruptcy of the first Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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Spanish bank, the old Bank of San Carlos (1782-1829), which became the Bank of San 
Fernando in 1829. This was the only bank in Spain until the 1840s, when other banking 
institutions began to open on the peninsula. 
The Code of Commerce (1829) regulated the opening of banks. This Code called for 
royal authorization for the founding of an issuing bank and the government was required to 
name a royal commissioner entrusted with making sure that legislation was upheld. In 1844 
two acts made it possible to open the new issuing banks, the Bank of Isabel II (located in 
Madrid) and the Bank of Barcelona. The Bank of Isabel II was absorbed by the Bank of San 
Fernando, but one branch  – the Bank of Cadiz – was constituted as an independent bank after 
the absorption. 
In 1856, a new law liberalized the creation of issuing banks. The banks that had 
existed up  until that time (San Fernando, Cadiz and Barcelona) lost the monopoly of bank-
note issuing within their respective cities. Issuing banks, commercial banks and credit and 
factoring societies coexisted over the next two decades, until the Bank of Spain obtained the 
monopoly for issuing bank notes in Spain in 1874. 
Historians have studied the Spanish financial system of the 1856-1874 period
1. 
However, there is little historiography for the period leading up to 1856. Tedde (1999) studied 
the Bank of San Fernando, Zumalacárregui (1952), Ruíz Velez Frías (1977) and Tedde (1984) 
studied the Bank of Cadiz, and Cabana (1978) studied the Bank of Barcelona. 
Spanish historiography has  lagged behind in terms of banking. The European tradition 
of central banking had bloomed late in Spain. Ramon’s book (1929) in France and Clapham’s 
book (1945) in England were both written before 1950. However, comparable studies on 
Spain, Pedro Tedde’s books (1988 and 1999), were published in the final decades of the 20
th 
century. 
Authors  writing about the Bank of Barcelona used indirect sources because the archive 
of the bank was lost. A few years ago the documents turned up in an office of  Banco 
Santander Central Hispano, which donated the archive to the  Catalan government. These 
documents constitute the Historical Batch of the Bank of Barcelona, and are now deposited in 
the  National Archive of Catalonia. The source includes the minutes of the Shareholders’ 
General Meetings, the minutes of the Board of Governors meetings, the minutes of the Board 
of Directors meetings, and Statutes and General and Particular Regulations of the bank, and 
the bank’s Special Operation Regulations, and much qualitative information very useful for 
interpreting the data of financial statements
2. 
                                                 
1 Although not totally exhaustive, it is worth mentioning the work of Tedde on the Bank of San Carlos (1988) 
and also his study on the Bank of Cadiz (1984); previous studies on the Bank of Cadiz include those of 
Zumalacárregui (1952) and Ruíz Vélez Frías (1977). Also of note are studies by Ródenas (1978) on the 
application of the Peel law in Spain. On the Bank of Catalonia, the effort of Cabana (1978) in compiling and 
putting information at the disposal of the researchers must be acknowledged. As far as this study is concerned, 
the only existing monograph to date on the Bank o f Barcelona is by Cabana, which we will discuss. 
Additionally, Sudrià (1982) carried out a study in the 1980s on banking in Catalonia. For other Spanish banks, 
some studies, such as the one by García López (1989), have been made of specific institutions. 
2 The appearance of the documentation of the Bank of Barcelona is relatively recent. In this respect, see: Blasco 
(2003). Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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The items on financial statements (balance sheets, and profit and loss accounts) are not 
normalized. In Spain, as Hernández Esteve (2003:4) indicates: “ the period that we have 
established for studying the origins and development of the concept of accounting as a 
science starts in 1800. Nevertheless, the real period of interest begins in 1825, when José 
María Brost’s book, Curso completo de Teneduría de libros o modo de llevarlos por partida 
doble, was published”. The Code of Commerce (30 May 1829) regulated the accounting rules 
of mercantile companies (Second section: On mercantile accounting [Articles 32-55]). The 
double-entry methodology was used in financial accounting and three books were required: 
the balance sheet and ledger and the journal book. The balance sheet had  to be annual and 
included cash, accounts receivable and fixed assets, and capital and liabilities. Uniformity was 
not necessary. Neither the order nor the detail of the accounts on the balance sheet was 
required. The prudence principle inspired the ledger  / journal entries, although these entries 
followed the payment principle, contrary to the accrual basis applied in the current financial 
accounting system. 
The books had to be safeguarded against falsification, bound and numbered by the 
Court of Commerce.  Crossed-out text, deletions and corrections in accounting books were 
forbidden and the accounting had to be in Spanish. Those who failed to follow these rules 
were fined. 
The Bank of Barcelona was a limited-liability company authorized to issue bank notes. 
As a result of this privilege, its statutes regulated the basis of financial accounting according 
to the Code of Commerce
3. The Board of Governors had to draw up a half-yearly balance 
sheet to show to the Shareholders’ General Meeting (Image 1 shows one e xample of the 
balance sheets). The Board of Governors of the Bank of Barcelona knew the importance of 
accounting in the management of the organization. For this reason, Antonio Guillén Suárez, 
author of the 1839 book Tratado compendioso de la contabilidad mercantil en partida doble, 
was appointed accounting manager of the bank on 30 May 1845
4. 
Although the Code of Commerce did not require the uniformity principle, the bank 
explained the reasons for changes in its accounting criteria in its Annual Reports. T hanks to 











                                                 
3 Statutes and General and Particular Regulations of the Bank of Barcelona were approved by the Queen the 1st 
May of 1844 and the 25th March of 1845. 
4 Historical documentation of the Bank of Barcelona. Arxiu Històric Nacional de Catalunya, Statements of the 
Board of Governors, 30 May 1845. Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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Image 1: Balance Sheet of the Bank of Barcelona (30 June 1850) 
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ACTIVO  31/6/1850    PASIVO  31/6/1850    GANANCIAS Y PÉRDIDAS  31/6/1850 
  Deben los SS accionistas el 
75% del valor nominal de sus 
acciones 
750.000,000    Importe de los billetes en 
circulación 
490.490,000     Las utilidades por descuentos, 
préstamos y comisiones has sido 
durante el semestre, de 
22.401,510 
 Valores en cartera   1.026.922,104     Saldo de cuentas corrientes   1.348.660,768    DEDUCCIONES   6.845,683 
Valores en cartera procedentes 
de adjudicaciones 
66.954,060    Saldo a favor de la 
Excelentísima Junta de 
carreteras de las cuatro 
provincias de Cataluña 
131.292,163     Gastos oficinas, contribución y 
otros ordinarios 
809,602 
Metálico existente en la Caja 
del Banco  
1.458.930,110    Depósitos   263.279,733    Alquileres liquidados  549,797 
 Gastos de instalación 
amortizables  
4.934,603     Dividendos de beneficios 
pendientes de cobro  
836,000     Sueldos de empleados   5.125,066 
 Muebles y utensilios idem  3.690,884    Dividendos reintegrables 
pendientes de cobro 
4.650,000     Corretajes   111,758 
 En poder del encargado de 
gastos  
42,883     Alcances de corredores   130,963    Gastos de instalación 
amortizados 
125,000 
Almacenajes por cobrar  303,804    Valores pendientes  1.506,195    Muebles y utensilios, 
amortización 
125,000 
Saldo de cuentas transitorias   11.384,374    Corresponsales   66.072,664    BENEFICIO  15.555,827 
Valores en amortización  11.796,575    Obligaciones por pagar  573,725     10% Juntas de Gobierno y 
directiva  
1.555,583 
Saldo en poder de la Caja 
Subalterna de Palma 
5.688,639     Reserva de beneficios   25.000,000    Beneficio líquido   14.000,244 
Efectos existentes en la cartera 
de dicha sucursal 
7.400,000     Capital del Banco   1.000.000,000    Se deducen para aplicar a la 
cuenta de valores en 
amortización 
1.500,211 
Total activo  3.348.048,038    Total pasivo  3.332.492,211    Quedan repartibles  12.500,000 
       
  BENEFICIO  15.555,827   
O sean 2.500 duros por cada una de las 5.000 
acciones que componen el capital del Banco 
 
 
The Bank of Barcelona within the context of Spanish banking in the mid-19
th century 
The first studies of the historiography of Spanish banking date from the 1940s 
(Canosa, 1945; Tallada, 1946). However, the most significant contributions were made 
starting in the 1970s (Sánchez Albornoz, 1968; Ruiz Martin, 1970; Tortella, 1973). Tortella 
(1973) produced a seminal text on the historiography. He analysed the origin of capitalism in 
Spain and placed s pecial emphasis on the organization of the financial system and its effects 
on economic growth in the middle decades of the 19
th century. Tortella did his dissertation 
with Rondo Cameron’s supervision; as a result, his research used as its main reference t he 
Cameron approach (Cameron, 1974). The studies carried out at that time focused on searching 
for explanations for the backwardness of the Spanish system. As such, Spanish historiography 
was occupied principally with offering general explanations and additional data in order to 
attempt to establish the macro magnitudes that would make it possible to thoroughly 
understand the period. 
Banks were not unknown in Spain in earlier times. In fact, the Taula de Canvi, created 
in Barcelona in 1401, is an early example, along with some other failed experiments at the 
end of the 18
th century (Feliu and Adroer, 1989; Ruíz Martín, 1970). However, it was not until 
the mid-19
th century that modern banks began to appear on the peninsula. Throughout the Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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1840s an interest in banking was generated in many cities
5. This interest occurred relatively 
late in the context of the evolution of banking in the rest of Europe. The political and 
institutional causes for this should be mentioned. On the matter of political evolution, Spain 
suffered great instability starting in the beginning of the 19
th century, which included the 
problems caused by the independence of its colonies, the Napoleonic invasion and, to round 
matters off, the internal conflict that plagued the first four decades of the century. 
Nonetheless, at the beginning of the 1840s the political situation appeared to become more 
stable, thus stimulating business. The only bank in existence until the 1820s was the Bank of 
San Carlos, which experienced an adverse state of affairs due to the depreciation of royal 
promissory notes. This led to the closing down of the institution in 1829 and the emergence of 
the Bank of San Fernando
6. Despite relative political stability, Spanish banking continued to 
be subject to major restrictions until 1856. 
The Spanish government was not permissive concerning the development of limited-
liability companies (Tortella, 1968) in the first half of 19
th century. The creation of such a 
company required the approval of the Court of Commerce and, in cases where some kind of 
privilege existed (as was the case of issuing banks), the approval of the King or Queen was 
also needed. Until 1856 and especially after the 1848 crisis, this legislation resulted in major 
restrictions with regard to the founding of b anks, credit societies and other joint-stock 
companies of a commercial or industrial nature
7. 
Despite the lack of affection for financial institutions, in 1845 two permits were 
granted to open provincial issuing banks on the peninsula: one which paved the  way for the 
opening of the Bank of Isabel II in Madrid at the beginning of 1845; and some months later 
another authorizing the Bank of Barcelona. The Bank of Isabel II was set up by José de 
Salamanca, a well-known businessman, speculator and minister (Martín Aceña, 2002). The 
institution had been operating for barely two years when, in 1847, it was “forcibly” merged 
with San Fernando Bank, which took over its dubious portfolio. With some difficulty, the 
Cadiz branch of the Bank of Isabel II obtained the issuing privilege. After the episode of the 
closing of the Bank of Isabel II, there remained three banks with the right to issue bank notes: 
the Bank of San Fernando in Madrid (whose fundamental purpose involved acting as banker 
to the government), the Bank of Cadiz and the Bank of Barcelona.  
                                                 
5 Tortella (1973): apart from the Bank of San Carlos and the Bank of San Fernando, which have their own 
history, it also mentions the Bank of Isabel II (including its branch in Cadiz), as well as two short-lived, non-
issuing banking ventures, namely, Banco de la Unión and Banco de Fomento y Ultramar. In the 1840s other 
banks that did not have the right to issue bank notes were set up in the provinces: Caja de Descuentos 
Zaragozana and Sociedad Valenciana de Fomento. 
6 On the subject of the Bank of San Carlos, see Hamilton (1970) and Tedde (1988). Tortella (1986) put together 
an index of shareholders of the Bank of San Carlos. With regard to the Bank of San Fernando, see Tortella 
(1970). Tedde (1999) is an essential work. 
7 On 28
  January 1848, a restrictive Public Limited Company Law was passed, accompanied by a set of 
regulations (dictated by a Royal Decree of 17
 February 1848, which included public limited partnerships). As 
such, the setting up of a company required the approval of either the legislative assembly or the queen, an 
awkward and expensive process designed to act as a disincentive for the founding of these companies. 
Although the 1848 crisis has been associated with this legislation, the legislation was prior to the crisis (which 
began in France on 23 and 24 February). It appeared to be more a response to the problems with the Banks of 
Isabel II and San Fernando than to the 1848 crisis, understood as a response to the events in France after the 
destitution of Louis Philippe II, Duke of Orléans.  Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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Three commercial firms of the city founded the Bank of Barcelona. The opening 
permit for the institution was granted to them  in extremis. The minister García de Carrasco, 
Count of Santa Olalla, signed the authorization o n the day prior to his resignation; his 
successor was reluctant to open banking institutions. The bank began its operations in August 
1845 with a nominal capital of 1 million  duros (1 duro=5 pesetas; 166,386 pesetas= 1 euro), 
of which a quarter was to be disbursed, and it was authorized to issue a maximum amount of 
bank notes equal to the nominal capital. Businessmen and some industrialists of the city were 
well represented within the management structure
8.  
The reasons presented by the management of the institution on requesting 
authorization to open the bank were linked to the commercial and industrial growth of the 
city. As they point out: “ The commercial firms of this city which shall sign here below 
(Girona Hermanos Clavé y Cía., José María Serra, Plandolit Hermanos), observing the 
progressive increase in manufacturing within the Principality, the multiplying of transactions 
and commercial contracts, the strength being acquired by commerce and industry and the 
upwards trend in the forming of partnerships; acknowledging equally the obstacles to rapid 
growth of public wealth represented by the lack of hard cash in certain cases, the suppression 
of manufacturing orders and lack of equipment for industrial firms, became convinced that in 
Barcelona there was a need for an element capable of avoiding such obstacles in the fashion 
of what is advantageously practised in other European capitals, i.e., a Factoring Bank; a 
truly powerful aid for the most widespread development of commercial, manufacturing and 
industrial operations, the benefits of which could spread to agriculture and every stratum of 
society. The three firms mentioned above proposed the creation of the Bank of Barcelona to 
His Majesty’s Government at the commencement of the year 1842, including its statutes. 
Certain partners made repeated journeys to this effect, dedicated to the clear need for such an 
establishment and subsequent to not inconsiderable expenses and the delay which unfortunate 
events in this capital provoked, thanks to their industry and the powerful help received from 
influential persons of the Court, they have finally achieved from His Majesty the approval for 
the establishment of the aforementioned bank and consequently in the aforementioned city of 
Barcelona...."
9  
The Bank of Barcelona obtained royal approval for its constitution on 1 May 1844, but 
another year passed before it received definitive authorization to set up shop, which occurred 
in August 1845. Its shares were subscribed immediately and there were initially 250 
shareholders. The Shareholders’ General Meeting, the Board of Governors and the Board of 
Directors evaluated the activity and management of the institution. The government, with the 
bank’s approval, named a royal commissioner entrusted with ensuring compliance with the 
rules. Image 2 describes the functions of the institution’s principal organs and executive 
positions. 
The Board of Governors created a committee made up of several board members and 
assigned them the task of drawing up the half-yearly financial statements, which were then 
presented to the Shareholders’ General Meeting. These financial statements included the 
balance sheet, profit and loss account and an explanation of the operations performed. 
                                                 
8 A study of the composition of the Board of Governors of the bank in the early years of its existence can be 
consulted in Blasco (2001). 
9 Minutes from the meeting of the Board of Directors of 20 August 1844, page 5. Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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Furthermore, according to its statutes, the bank was obliged to send a fortnightly balance 
sheet to the government.  
The bank’s half-yearly financial statements have not been studied until now because 
they were lost. Tortella (1973) and Cabana (1978) based their studies on the Bank of 
Barcelona’s financial statements of 1894
10. These 1894 financial statements are special 
because they briefly review the history of the institution and document the evolution of large 




                                                 
10 Cabana collects data for December of the years in the 1845-1920 period: bank notes in circulation, current 
accounts, deposits, portfolio, equity of the institution, cash assets and profits. We have checked the data in 
Cabana’s book against the 1894 financial statement and the two coincide, except in the case of profits, which 
do not appear in the financial statements. We are not aware of the source he used since this data does not 
coincide with that provided in the half-yearly financial statements. There are certain presentational problems 
with the data: in the case of deposits, only two voluntary deposits are recorded up to 1848 and from this period 
on he provides total figures since the financial statements do not break them down. When he records the 
owners’ equity of the institution, he warns that some columns (1,2,3,4) are in duros up until 1874 and that 
others are in pesetas for the entire period. Cash assets are presented in pesetas, yet the bank-note totals in cash 
assets are given in duros with no warning given to the reader.  
11 On checking this financial statement against the half-yearly financial statements, a number of points must be 
explained: 1. The entry for bank notes in circulation corresponds to the item issued bank notes. However, in 
some years there are differences between the two concepts. For the period with which we are concerned, the 
greatest differences can be found in the first half of 1848, the last half of 1855 and first half of 1856; 2. The 
entry for current accounts does not include other payment obligations (cheques pending, transitory accounts, 
values pending, brokers, other non-specific payment obligations, correspondents, etc.); hence, there are always 
differences between the two; 3. It does not take into account certain items such as transitory accounts, balance 
of correspondents and effects in branches and values in amortization, etc., which alter the value of the portfolio 
values entry. Furthermore, the figures for portfolio values in the half-yearly financial statements for the 
accounting periods of June 1846, June 1848 and December 1848 do not coincide with those which appear in 
the financial statement of 1894; 4. The entry for cash assets includes coins, bank notes and Catalan calderilla. 
Until now, the authors had not picked up on this point. The entry for cash assets differs from the 1894 financial 
statement in the accounting periods of December 1846, June 1847 and December 1847.  Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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Image 2: Organizational Structure of the Workings of the Bank of Barcelona, 1844-1856 
 
Shareholders’ General Meeting
Shareholder with 5 or more shares can participate.
They have a single vote.
Board of Governors
15 members, 3 substitutes.
Approves signatures admitted for factoring. 
Fixes factoring rates and amount to invest according to nature of security.
Agrees on when to issue bank notes and the amount. 
Determines dividend total.
Decides on management guidelines.
Meets once a week.
Members must hold a minimum of 40 shares.
Members earn 4% of the bank’s liquid profits.
Board of Directors
3 directors. Names the Administrator, with whom he collaborates closely.
Grants or refuses factoring operations, advances and loans.
Approves opening of current accounts.
Takes decisions on the day-to-day running of the establishment: issue of bank notes.
Meets 3 times a week. Members must hold at least 100 shares.
Members earn 6% of the bank’s liquid profits.
Administrator
Manages day-to-day running of bank along with service manager and represents the bank off the premises.
Must be on bank premises while the bank is open and no payments can be verified without his authorization.
Attends Board of Directors meetings but only as consultant.
Before assuming position, must deposit a guarantee of 25,000 duros. Can be dismissed by management.   
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Description of financial assets and liabilities on the Balance sheet and entries in the 
Profit and Loss account 
The reports provide quantitative information in a heterogeneous form. Moreover, the 
criteria for submission of balance sheets were modified a number of times in the 1844-1856 
period. It has been necessary to standardize and systematize the presentation of data. We have 
grouped the accounts presented in the balance sheets. The information in the records of the 
Board of Directors, Board of Governors and  Shareholders’ General Meeting was essential. 
The criteria we followed for grouping assets are described below. 
 
1. Financial assets 
* 1.1  Cash assets: This entry is based on the institution’s own definition of cash assets 
(coins, bank notes and promissory notes of  calderilla
12) plus a small cash entry comprising 
the cash held by the expenses manager and the cash deposited at secondary branches
13. 
Accordingly, the total amount of this item includes coins (gold and silver coins of intrinsic 
value), the bank notes of the bank and, from 1852 onward, and the Catalan  calderilla 
promissory notes which the bank negotiated
14.  
According to the statutes approved on the opening of the bank, the institution always 
had to keep, in deposit and in coins, a sum equivalent to one third of the bank notes issued 
(Article 40 of the statutes) In the laws of 1849 and 1851, this requirement was altered as 
follows: “the quantity of coins [in deposit] must always be at least equivalent to one third of 
the value of the bank notes in circulation.” (Article 3. Banking Law, 15 December 1851). 
 
* 1.2  Accounts receivable: The main entry  in this group is  equity holdings. In this 
section two accounts with insignificant totals are also included:  the balance of correspondent 
banks and commercial paper in secondary branches. Furthermore, as a result of the 1847-1848 
crisis, several entries appeared relating to the non-payment of the holdings account. Such 
                                                 
12 Catalan copper coins.  
13 The bank was authorized to open branches. One was set up in Tarragona and later moved to Reus and another 
was opened in Mallorca. After the 1848 crisis, the Reus branch was closed down.  
14 The aim of issuing promissory notes of Catalan calderilla was to gradually withdraw the copper coins known 
as calderilla catalana from circulation in 1852. The notes were legal tender in Catalonia and of compulsory 
admission in up to 20% of the total of any single cashing in or paying out operation, according to a Royal 
Decree of 5 August 1852 and lowered to 10% by a decree of 6
 December. On this matter, see Pascual (1987). 
The part played by the bank in this process was to accept encashments and make payments with up to 10% of 
promissory notes of calderilla, which caused certain problems. In a meeting of the Board of Directors on 13 
December 1852, the management took the decision that from that moment on, outward payments would be 
made using the same proportions of each “kind of money”  – coins, bank notes and promissory notes of 
calderilla – as employed by the client when paying in the amount in the first place. However, later on, on 21 
February 1853, the bank decided to impose a minimum reimbursement of 250  duros (5-peseta coins) for 
cashing cheques. This measure was an endeavour to put an end to the attempts of some bank clients to take 
advantage of the depreciation of promissory notes; according to the Board of Directors, many cheques for 
small quantities were brought to the bank to be cashed, for which the institution could only use the lowest 
denomination promissory note of  calderilla  - with the lowest depreciation and, therefore, those in most 
demand. In turn, individual clients paid in the highest denomination promissory notes - with the highest 
depreciation  - into their current accounts. It was later impossible for the bank to place them due to the 
fractioning of the amount of the cheques mentioned above.  Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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entries petered out in the post-crisis period but acquire importance in this situation. Equity 
holdings were from appropriations, securities pending, balances of transitory accounts, 
outstanding payments on storage securities and amortization securities. This section 
encompasses all bank assets from its lending and factoring operations (promissory notes and 
payment instalments  - two items that are impossible to differentiate here). Loans were 
authorized in exchange for security: accounts receivable (maximum 2 months renewable), 
fruits and commercial paper (maximum 3 months renewable), and foreign currencies and 
precious metals (maximum 4 months). Borrowers would sign a promissory note made 
available to them by the bank, but the security was kept by the bank. However, in the case of 
profit and commercial paper and from the 1850s onward (when the bank totally abandoned its 
own warehouses after the crisis), it was stored in the warehouse of the company with which 
the bank had reached a custody agreement. In the case of public debt, the borrower had to 
replenish what was necessary in case value had been lost. Factoring operations were carried 
out through instalments or promissory notes not exceeding f our months and had to be signed 
by three individuals vetted by the bank (which granted a maximum of 100,000  duros in 
credit). Alternatively, two individuals vetted by the bank could sign, but in this case they had 
to deposit shares, accounts receivable or  other negotiable commercial paper as security in the 
bank’s power. 
  
* 2.  Capital assets: The bank accounted for capital assets in terms of net value. The 
following entries were included: buildings, furniture and fixtures, and installation costs. We 
have c onsidered the entry of installation costs (2.1 Fixed Assets) as an  Intangible Asset (2.2); 
we have not considered this entry a fictitious asset since it is maintained throughout the period 
of analysis. In December 1856 the bank substantially modified the s tructure of capital assets 
upon the acquisition of the most well-known headquarters of the bank, an old cannon factory 
known as the Afinos
15 building.  
 
* 3.  Uncalled share capital: In its statutes, the bank included the obligation of 
disbursing 25% of the  nominal capital upon initiating operations. At the same time, the 
statutes also envisaged that whenever possible this percentage should not be exceeded
16. The 
part of the capital that was underwritten and not disbursed acted as a kind of “reserve as 
additional guarantee” in the hands of the shareholders
17. 
During the early years, several disbursements exceeding 25% were carried out, 
including those triggered by the 1848 crisis. But from that time onward, the disbursement 
excess continued. Starting in 1855 a c apital increase was made but the criterion of a 
                                                 
15 The name refers to the process of purifying and refining metal. 
16 Article 25 of the Statutes. This was the novelty introduced by the Bank of Barcelona according to Tortella 
(1973:36). This idea was applied by the Bank of Cadiz starting in 1848; it remained the case until 1860. See: 
Torrejón and Higueras (2003:26). We are grateful to Gáspar Feliu for this information. 
17 Financial statement read at the Shareholders’ General Meeting of the Bank of Barcelona, 1 August 1847. p. 3. 
Also, the financial statement of 20 May 1894 (50
th anniversary) explains that “the strong reserves in the hands 
of the shareholders constitute a highly valuable resource for countering the effects of great crises that banks 
may be subject to, even making them impossible to bankrupt, in the face of one of those cataclysms against 
which human foresight can do nothing." Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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4. Financial liabilities 
* 4.1  Bank notes: The bank notes of the Bank of Barcelona began to circulate ninety 
days after the bank opened its doors in October 1845. The notes of lowest and highest 
denominations were 10 and 100  duros,  respectively. Although an attempt was made to print 
them outside the country, they were finally produced in Barcelona following a l aborious 
process to avoid forgery.  
According to the bank's statutes, bank notes for the value of the nominal capital could 
be issued (1 million  duros until 1855)
19. However, a law of 4 May 1849 modified this limit in 
that it restricted issuing in respect of the situation initially addressed by the bank statutes
20.  
 
* 4.2  Current accounts: they accepted coins or bank notes issued by the bank, the 
amounts of commercial paper payable whose collection was entrusted to the bank and with a 
maximum due date of 10  days, as well as the amount in cash of the factoring operations 
carried out by the bank
21. The sums were available one day after their deposit in the account 
and current accounts could not be overdrawn. The bank requested that clients who contracted 
debenture bonds through their current account advise the administrator  ten days before their 
due date with all the details of the debenture bond contracted
22. 
The opening of current accounts occurred very slowly initially and operations carried 
out through them only got going after the 1848 crisis and the restriction of bank notes 
produced by the laws of 1849-51. Once an agreement had been reached on the collection of 
calderilla, 10% the reimbursement of the amounts in current accounts could be carried out 
with  calderilla, although bank managers first maintained the criterion of repaying deposits 
and current accounts with the same type of money that had been paid into the bank. 
 
* 4.3  Other payment commitments: this groups together several entries of minor 
amounts,  namely: outstanding cheques (or commercial paper), transitory accounts, securities 
pending, broker operations, the balances of correspondents and the balance of the Roads 
                                                 
18 This capital increase would bring them several problems which became evident in the years subsequent to 
those covered by this study. 
19 There was a period, in 1847 and 1848, when the bank exceeded its legal issuing limit, although it always 
obeyed the other issuing requirement, namely, to keep one third of the notes issued in deposit in cash. 
However, it was not exactly a legal infraction, because there was a statutory possibility to increase the issuing 
limit up to twice the nominal capital in case of the bank maintained one third of the bank notes in cash. 
20 Article 6. “From now on, there will one sole issuing bank and an attempt will be made to reach an agreement 
between the Banks of San Fernando, Cadiz and Barcelona, in order to find a way of ensuring the union 
between the latter two and the former with no damage whatsoever to their respective interests and with the 
approval of the government. If the said union cannot be achieved, the acquired rights of the Banks of Cadiz 
and Barcelona will not be affected and their authority to issue notes to the value of the effective paid-out 
capital existent in the banks will be maintained.” 
21 Special Operations Regulations for the Bank of Barcelona, Chapter 4, Article 50. 
22 Special Operations Regulations for the Bank of  Barcelona, Chapter 4, Article 56. Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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Commission of Catalonia. This commission had opened a current account in 1848 earmarked 
for roads infrastructure in the Catalan provinces.   
 
* 4.4  Commitments to shareholders: this corresponds to the entries of dividends 
pending collection on behalf of the shareholders and to the  refund of disbursed capital above 
25%.  
 
5 Long-Term Liabilities 
* 5.1 Deposits: We have considered deposits repayable at six months to be long-term 
deposits. The types of deposits acknowledged by the bank between June 1846 and 1849 were: 
voluntary, judicial, by substitutes and those deposited by the Caja de Ahorros de Barcelona
23 
deposited. From December 1849 until the end of the period covered by this study, the bank 
only listed deposits without breaking them down. 
Deposits allowed: securities of domestic and foreign debt, bills of exchange, bank 
notes, shares, debentures of all kinds, gold and silver ingots and domestic and foreign gold 
and silver coins. Although they accepted precious stones in deposit, soon after beginning 
operations they decided not to accept deposits of jewels
24. They were six months renewable 
and charged 0.12% annually. Exceptions were made, however, and there were periods when 
they did not collect on the custody of certain kinds of deposits, such as voluntary ones in 
1854. The bank’s notion of deposits as insurance is expressed through a problem which it had 
in February 1853: “Given the proliferation of the abuse of taking out small loans and handing 
over items of considerable value as security as a way of avoiding the custody-right payments 
properly due to the institution if the operation had been effected as appropriate, in the form of 
a sealed deposit, it was agreed that, in future, a maximum of double the amount borrowed 
may be accepted as security”
25. This exemplifies somewhat the notion of the bank as a safe 
deposit charging a fee for the c ustody of items. The notion of a deposit understood as 
brokerage does not appear here and it seems that banks operated under the first notion. The 
odd exception did exist, such as the  Caja de Ahorros de Barcelona, which had a special 
approach. It charged 4 % annually in interest, due to the character of the institution, which 
aimed to reward saving by the people and generate a culture propitious to this end. But this 
special approach was also aimed at avoiding competition
26. 
 
6 Owners’ equity 
* 6.1 Entries in the Profit and Loss Account  
* A. Income: For the year 1846 (1
st and 2
nd six months), the source breaks down income 
into the following categories: income from factoring operations and loans (entry which 
accounts for practically all income), profit and bankers drafts or instalments to be negotiated, 
profit from currency exchange and entitlements from appraised deposits. In the first six 
                                                 
23 Savings Bank of Barcelona. 
24 Special Operations Regulations for the Bank of Barcelona, Chapter 3, Article 38.  
25 Minutes of Management Board Meeting, 3 January 1853. 
26 Minutes of Board of Directors Meeting, 8 October 1845. Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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months of 1847 the entry of Forfeiture on account of pending securities appeared. Starting in 
1847 the profit and loss account did not break down the source of income.  
 
* B.  Expenditure: In the  Payment of interest and commissions account the following 
were included: interest paid to the  Caja de Ahorros, expenses and commissions paid to 
secondary branches, brokerage operations, diverse commissions and guarantees paid, 
securities pending and bankers' drafts. The securities pending entry, which only appears in the 
second half of 1846, corresponds to “the levies imposed on this establishment which have not 
been satisfied and whose reduction was requested from the government”
27. The account Other 
operating costs covers the following items: office expenses, payments due to currency 
weakness, leases (of the warehouses which the bank prepared in order to store the items  – 
mainly cotton  – deposited as security in exchange for loans, which they began to close down 
after 1848), along with an entry for temporary expenses. The accounts of  personnel expenses 
and the  endowment for the amortization of capital assets were also included. Only one entry 
for taxes appeared in the first six months of business, namely, “levies”  – accounting for 17% 
of the profit figures. From 1851 onward everything was amalgamated and the payment of 
taxes was not broken down. 
 
* 6.2  Reserves: Reserves were contemplated in article 44 of the bank statutes as 
follows: “A quarter of profits will constitute a reserve fund, 1% of which will be invested in 
charity work to be decided on by the Shareholders’ General Meeting”. Article 46 continues: 
“Once the reserve fund reaches a quarter of the bank’s capital, profits will be shared”. Article 
7 of the law of 4 May 1849 states: “The bank shall have a reserve fund equivalent to 10% of 
its effective capital”, referring to the Bank of San Fernando, but obliging those of Barcelona 
and Cadiz to bring their statutes into line with the new law. This is why, when they reached 
10% of their effective capital (June 1850), they ceased to increase the reserves until the 
capital was increased (June 1855). 
 
*  6.3  Underwritten capital: The nominal capital with which the bank began operations 
amounted to one million  duros, which was underwritten in its entirety. In the first six months 
of 1855 this capital was increased by half a million  duros and by a further half a million again 
in the second six months. As such, in December, 1855, it had a nominal capital of 2 million 
duros. In the second six months of 1856 this capital was doubled, which meant that in 
December of that year it stood at 4 million  duros. These successive increases in capital 
obeyed a change in circumstances. In 1854 a change of government came about (the so-called 
bienio progresista
28) which paved the way for a new chapter in legislation encompassing the 
passing of both the Railways and Banks and Credit Societies acts, thus generating new 
investment prospects for the country.  
 
                                                 
27 Banco de Barcelona. Minutes of Management Board meeting, 28 December 1846. 
28 The name given to the period from 1854-1856 in Spain which stood out due to the return to power of 
Espartero, Count of Luchana, a general and politician who had gained much prestige in the victory of the battle 
of Luchana in the first Carlist war.  Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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Analysis of the management of the Bank of Barcelona
29 
Our aim is to carry out an accounting analysis of the Bank of Barcelona in relation to 
the harmonization of the institution's microeconomic objectives, i.e. solvency, liquidity and 
profitability. To this end, based on the information in the half-yearly financial statements of 
the Shareholders’ General Meeting, the minutes of these meetings, along with the minutes of 
the Board of Governors and Board of Directors Meetings of the Bank of Barcelona, we have 
carried out a full analysis of the accounting state of affairs of the bank. The financial 
statements provide the quantitative information in a heterogeneous way; it has proved 
necessary to homogenize and systemize the data presentation. In the preceding paragraph a 
detailed explanation is given of the items included in the entries on the balance sheet and the 




Modern banking carries out the financial function of brokerage by means of the 
acquisition of savings and the posterior placement of them as a credit investment. At the same 
time, the owners’ equity covers the investment in permanent assets and serves as an ultimate 
guarantee before creditors and as margin against eventualities. 
The privilege of issuing allowed institutions to increase the opportunities for 
investment beyond the acquisition of liabilities (current accounts and deposits). To this end 
the use of the bank’s own resources acts as an ultimate guarantee of solvency: “ If the banks 
issue bank notes, it is because they receive trade bills, promissory notes and other securities 
or guarantees in exchange, in accordance with the proceedings laid down in their statutes 
and regulations. This surety in itself pacifies the business community since the most plentiful 
responsibility for the owners’ equity corresponding to each and every one of these 
establishments also remains.”
31 
In general terms, solvency determines the viability of the company in the long term. 
Solvency is determined by the difference between real assets and liabilities payable, which 
defines the relationship between owners’ equity and liabilities payable. This viewpoint 
focuses on the central role of banking as a user of resources and, as such, this percentage 
shows the subsidiary function that owners’ equity exercises as a guarantee fund.  
In the case of the Bank of Barcelona, owners’ equity acted as a guarantee in the event 
of difficulties caused by bankruptcy protection. This last guarantee was made evident by 
maintaining 75% of the underwritten capital pending for disbursement; with this resource it 
was possible to avoid keeping idle money in the bank. Nonetheless, at the same time the bank 
had enough legal backup to execute non-disbursed capital if necessary. Due to this 
particularity, we have considered potential solvency (over nominal capital) and real solvency 
(over disbursed capital). See Graph 1. 
                                                 
29 The methodology applied in this section is based on Kirchner (1974), Bachiller (1993) and Pedraja (1999). 
30 The balance sheets in the appendix are presented taking into account the entries for subscribed capital and 
shareholders with pending disbursements. However, given that the bank only demanded the disbursement of 
25% of the underwritten capital, for the purposes of our analysis (except in the solvency study), we have 
eliminated the entry of uncalled share capital in assets and have placed disbursed capital under liabilities. 
31 Banco de Barcelona. Half-yearly financial statement of 6 August 1848, p. 13. Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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Paid-in Capital Nominal Capital  
 
SOLVENCY (%) = real assets (%) –liabilities payable (%) 
 
Graph 1 shows that solvency was reduced after the 1847-1848 crisis. On initiating its 
activity, solvency (over nominal capital) was situated between 30%-40%, whereas once the 
crisis was over, it was reduced to a minimum of 20% in 1852. This trend altered at the end of 
the period analysed. In the first six months of 1855, the first capital increase was carried out, 
followed by two further increases in December 1855 and December 1856, respectively. 
According to bank’s Board of Directors, these capital increases responded to an explicit 
interest to improve solvency: 
 
“The simultaneous decrease in cash assets and increase in the portfolio, coinciding with the 
almost stationary permanence of obligations paid at sight, demonstrate the fundamental and 
even urgent need to place the bank in a position where it may avoid, under critical 
circumstances, in an attack of panic, the undesirable situation of possessing an overly inflated 
portfolio and the not unlikely danger, in respect of this, that if a part of the portfolio superior 
to the value of disbursed capital were to prove impossible to collect, the current guarantee in 
the hands of the shareholders might  prove insufficient.”
32 
 
Solvency over paid-in capital had the same behaviour after the 1847-48 crisis because 
there was not any extraordinary disbursement. But during the period 1846-1848, although 
solvency over nominal capital was reduced, solvency over paid-in capital increased as a result 
of  the extraordinary disbursements which covered insolvency problems during the financial 
crisis. 
                                                 
32 See Appendix 2. Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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The panic erupted in Barcelona in the wake of reports from France:  “When the 
unexpected news reached us in the capital of the revolution in France and the fall o f the 
Orleans family and the proclamation of the republic, its first effect was to cause general 
stupor, the same effect as when a thunderclap is heard followed by a bolt of lightning 
shooting out from a small innocent-looking cloud. The second reaction was one of alarm, a 
terrible panic, as if some immense and inescapable evil were to descend upon us with such 
urgency that, given the appearances and the haste with which some rounded off their business 
and put their things in good order, you would have thought that a great catastrophe was upon 
us. 
“The Bank of Barcelona experienced the first effects of this panic and in a few days, in just a 
few hours it had to face highly inflated sums, payment of which would have left it in dire 
straits ,if it had not had sufficient funds laid aside and not been so solidly organized.”
33 
 
The crisis was solved by extraordinary disbursements. In the second semester of 1846 
an extraordinary disbursement was carry out. Paid-in capital was 37.7%, superior to the 25% 
stipulated in the statutes
34. This first “extra” disbursement is related to several credit 
operations which cloaked the acquisition of public debt securities
35. A second extraordinary 
disbursement of 12.5% was added in the second half of 1847, as a result of the problems 
caused by the “industrial and monetary” crisis of that year in the paying back of loans and 
factoring instalments owed to the bank
36. The last addition to these disbursements was a third 
                                                 
33 El Fomento, 23 March 1848. 
34 Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Governors, 18 November 1846. 
35 At its inception, the Bank of Barcelona did not carry out operations explicitly with the Treasury. As Tortella 
points out (1973:44-5), it seems that the bank broke this rule starting in 1851 due to government pressure. 
Nevertheless, the loans made to the Treasury do not appear in the balance sheet for this period. Furthermore, 
between December 1845 and September 1846 the bank made several loans with guarantees of public-debt 
securities deposited in the Bank of San Fernando for a total amount of more than 350,000 duros (when the 
disbursed social capital amounted to 250,000  duros). Subsequently to carrying out these operations, the 
Treasury Minister, Alejandro Mon, reported the bank to parliament for performing speculative operations. To 
this end, the bank’s administrator, Jaime Badia, explained in the Diario de Barcelona newspaper of 3 February 
1846 (pp. 547-550) that the bank, “ has lent out its superfluous equity with the guarantee of public-debt 
securities at 3%.” Nevertheless, these activities linked to the Treasury went above and beyond superfluous 
equity. Because of this, when the bank decided to perform a further operation of this kind in November 1846 
(a further 250,000  duros on top of the 350,000  duros previously invested), it felt obliged to demand a 
disbursement of 12.5%. Despite the increased risk they posed for the institution, these cloaked operations with 
public-debt securities involved significant profits, as explained in the section on profitability.  
36 Extraordinary meeting of the Board of Governors, 6 May 1847. Minutes of the meeting of the Board of 
Governors of 28 June 1847. Half-yearly financial statement of 2 February 1848, p. 1. Financial statement read 
out at the Shareholders' General Meeting of the Bank of Barcelona, 1 August 1847, p. 4: “ One of the 
obligations which the Board of Governors also voluntarily imposed upon itself was that of preserving in its 
safe deposit [that of the bank] a third of its liabilities payable at sight. The principal banking institutions in 
England and France, pressured by the monetary crisis, had to relax this principle in order to satisfy the 
principal needs of industry and commerce. Yet the predicament of some was nevertheless so grave that in 
England especially, factoring operations were refused even to respectable firms despite the premium on these 
operations having been raised considerably in order to discourage them. Despite all this, the Bank of 
Barcelona ended the six months with a cash reserve which differed very little from its habitual state. 
Elsewhere, boards convened on a daily basis to determine the amounts that should be designated for factoring Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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in March 1848 (of a further 12.5%) as a response to the financial panic in order to offset the 
withdrawal of current accounts and the presentation of bank notes for redemption
37. 
Subsequent to the crisis, the institution started to pay back the extraordinary disbursements, 
until the figure of 25% was once again reached in December 1849, a position that was 
maintained until the end of the period in question. 
 
Liquidity 
Liquidity determines the viability of the institution in the short term. It implies 
maintaining the level of current assets in harmony with the acquisition of s hort-term savings 
in such a way as to guarantee the immediate repayment of liabilities in case such demands are 
made by the public. In turn, the structure of current assets (cash assets + credit) is subject to a 
trade-off between greater liquidity (cash assets) and greater profitability (credit), since the 
level of cash reserves determines maximum liquidity in detriment to the expansion of credit, 
which has a negative effect on the increase of profits. 
Liquidity is measured as the percentage difference between current assets and current 
liabilities (see Graph 2). Additionally, we have broken down current assets into two 
components: the proportion of current liabilities covered by cash assets and that which is 
employed in the concession of credit. With this, we wish to see what proportion of cash assets 












                                                                                                                                                         
since it was impossible for them to admit all the valid paper presented. The cash assets of the Bank of 
Barcelona naturally felt the effects of the common crisis. Nonetheless, since the board had other measures 
[disbursements] prepared, as can be seen, it was left unworried by the fact that a third of its liabilities were 
diminishing; but it has not refused for this motive any operation compliant with the conditions it has 
stipulated.”  
37 On the measures adopted by the bank in dealing with the financial panic of 1848, see the minutes of the Board 
of Directors meeting of 28 February 1848, pp. 143-144. If the worst came to the worst, the personal solvency 
of the directors played an important role. This role was not symbolic since during the 1848 crisis it was they 
who provided coins to meet the demand for changing bank notes. See the minutes of the meeting of the Board 
of Governors of the Bank of Barcelona of March and April 1848. Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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Cash Assets Accounts Receivable  
 
LIQUIDITY (%) = Current Assets – Current liabilities 
 
Graph 2 indicates that liquidity decreased substantially after t he 1848 crisis. In the 
early years, current assets exceeded current liabilities by just over 30%. As indicated in the 
solvency analysis, this proportion is inflated due to the disbursements of capital of 1846, 1847 
and 1848, which reduced the percentage of total liabilities represented by current liabilities. 
Once the “extraordinary” disbursements had been returned, the liquidity indicator placed 
current assets in excess of current liabilities by 10-20%. 
The decline in current assets shows that the proportion of surplus cash assets covering 
current liabilities (notes and current accounts) for the whole period was situated between 5% 
and 15% (Graph 2). Nevertheless, the proportion of cash assets increased in respect of the 
current assets total after the 1847-48 crisis. That is because business activity was reduced on 
the Catalan market after the financial crisis
38. This trend reversed from 1856 onward, when 
new investment opportunities were created in Barcelona. New credit investment prospects 
triggered by the  laws of 1855 (railway construction) and 1856 (the creation of banks and 
credit societies) increased the Bank of Barcelona's portfolio. 
 
Profitability 
Profitability is determined by the profits obtained from the credit granted, since the 
Bank of Barcelona did not reward the acquisition of liabilities (indeed, it even charged for it – 
see Appendix 1).  
                                                 
38 See Blasco and Nogués (2007) for a complete explanation of the Bank of Barcelona credit policy. Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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Graph 3 shows the evolution of profits obtained by the bank
39. The substantial increase 
in profits that occurred between the first half of 1846 and December 1847 was linked to the 
reward obtained from operations with State debt
40. The sudden drop in profits starting in June 
1848 was due to the set of circumstances arising from the 1847 crisis. The portfolio could not 
present a clean bill of health until 1854. Nevertheless, starting in 1850, a sustained increase in 
profits was obtained, sustained by the increase in credit volume, which compensated for the 
reductions applied to interest rates
41. If we observe the increase that occurred between the 
minimum point reached in 1850 and the maximum obtained before the capital increase of 
1855, it can be confirmed that profits doubled in this period.  
 





















































































































































































































































Once we have observed the evolution of profits in absolute terms, we can define 
profitability from two basic viewpoints: return on assets and return on equity (see Graph 4). 
 
 
                                                 
39 Profits basically depended on the evolution of income, since expenses were very stable in this period, except 
in the second half of 1856 when expenses increased by 50%. This change in the level of spending was linked 
to the adaptation of the new bank headquarters acquired in 1855. 
40 We have evidence that the profits obtained from operations of public debt underwritten in Madrid were 
reflected in the profit and loss account, no doubt with the aim of demonstrating the potential of the business to 
shareholders. In the data of the financial statements, a total credit volume of 600,000 duros appears on top of 
the credit volume given in loans and factoring operations (710 documents with an average value of 3,785). 
This figure of 600,000  duros coincides with the amounts of public debt invested in Madrid. As such, the 
estimated interest rate for this accounting period surpasses the maximum rate stipulated in the statutes (6%). It 
has been calculated using the income figure. Because part of the income corresponds to public-debt operations 
of greater profitability, the average estimated interest rate is placed above the legal maximum. 
41 Blasco and Nogués (2007). Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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ROE ROA  
Return on Equity (ROE) (%) = Profits / Average Owners’ Equity 
Return on Assets (ROA) (%) = Profits / Average Total Assets 
 
Graph 4 shows that return on  equity and return on assets had a different trend after the 
1847-48 crisis, as ROE followed a growing trend until 1855, while the ROA trend was steady. 
That was the result of the increase in financial leverage. Return on equity rose while return on 
assets did not, because the Bank of Barcelona reduced the proportion of owners’ equity. From 
June 1846 to December 1848 owners’ equity average was 37.5%, while from June 1849 to 
June 1856 it was 27%, which represents an increase of 10% in financial leverage degree. 
Therefore, the increase in financial leverage represents a higher risk, i.e. the reduction 
of solvency and liquidity, as well as higher shareholder profitability. Graph 5 shows 
shareholder return. Average shareholder return was 8.15% for the whole period, 6.6% from 
1846 to 1848 and 8.85% from 1849 to 1856. That is a very high average return considering 













                                                 
42 Code of Commerce (1829), Book 2, Title 5, Articles 397-398. Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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Shareholder return (%) = dividend




The Bank of Barcelona was the first regional issuing bank in Spain. The recent 
recovery of the Bank of Barcelona archive has given us the opportunity to understand the 
business of a pioneer modern bank.  
  Our goal was to analyse the business decisions of the bank by examining its accounts. 
To do so, we first standardized the balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. First we 
collected all the data and then applied the criteria of current management of bank balance 
sheets. Then we analysed the business decisions using accounting ratios in order to find out 
how private banking financed its activity. Solvency, liquidity and profitability ratios showed 
that the Bank of Barcelona maintained a high risk for preventing shareholder profitability. 
The increase of financial leverage by about 10% indicates that the Bank of Barcelona gave 
priority to profitability in detriment to solvency and liquidity. Average shareholder return of 
more than 8% corroborates this risk financing policy. 
The Bank of B arcelona gained the issuing Royal Charter by providing a financial 
social service to the city of Barcelona in order to develop commercial, manufacturing and 
industrial activity. However, as a private enterprise, the main business objective was 
profitability. In the early days of the issuing banking system, which lacked strict 
                                                 
43 The dividend was calculated as profit minus the reserve fund assigned to next financial years minus quantities 
paid to the Board of Governors and Board of Directors, available in the financial statement presented to the 
Shareholders' General Meeting of the Bank of Barcelona. Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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governmental control, shareholder profitability took priority over other business aims such as 
solvency and liquidity. Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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Banco de Barcelona (1845-56): Memorias de la Junta General de Accionistas del Banco de Barcelona 
(Semestral financial statement), Arxiu Històric Nacional de Catalunya, Fons Banc de Barcelona. 
Banco de Barcelona (1894): Memorias del Banco de Barcelona presentada a la Junta General de Accionistas 
Extraordinaria del 20 de Mayo de 1894. 50 Aniversario de su fundación. Imprenta de Heinrich y Cia, 
Barcelona, Arxiu Històric Nacional de Catalunya, Fons Banc de Barcelona. 
Banco de Barcelona (1845-56): Minutes of the Shareholders' General Meeting, Arxiu Històric N acional de 
Catalunya, Fons Banc de Barcelona. 
Banco de Barcelona (1845-56): Minutes of the Board of Meeting Governors, Arxiu Històric Nacional de 
Catalunya, Fons Banc de Barcelona. 
Banco de Barcelona (1845-56): Minutes of the Board of Directors Meeting, Arxiu Històric Nacional de 
Catalunya, Fons Banc de Barcelona. 
Banco de Barcelona (1845-56): Special Operations Regulations for the Bank of Barcelona, Arxiu Històric 
Nacional de Catalunya, Fons Banc de Barcelona. 
Banco de Barcelona (1845-56): Statutes and General and Particular Regulations of the Bank of Barcelona were 
approved by the Queen on 1 May 1844 and 25 March 1845, Arxiu Històric Nacional de Catalunya, Fons 
Banc de Barcelona. 
Código de Comercio (30 may 1829), Imprenta real, Madrid. 
Diario de Barcelona, 1845-1856, Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat, Barcelona. 
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TABLE 2.1: BALANCE SHEET (data in DUROS) 
 
  ASSETS   30/06/1846
45  %  31/12/1846  %  30/06/1847  %  31/12/1847  %  30/06/1848  %  31/12/1848  % 
1  Current Assets  1.626.127,453  68,24  2.407.764,394  79,16 2.543.931,275  80,07 2.802.797,642  84,64 2.166.584,089  84,96  2.030.228,958  79,96 
1.1 CASH ASSETS  610.532,404  25,62  652.506,997  21,45 581.775,322  18,31 636.661,877  19,23 728.007,909  28,55  637.588,351  25,11 
1.2 ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE  1.015.595,049  42,62  1.755.257,397  57,71 1.962.155,953  61,76 2.166.135,765  65,42 1.438.576,180  56,41  1.392.640,607  54,85 
2  Capital Assets  6.820,884  0,29  7.631,005  0,25 8.273,139  0,26 8.450,176  0,26 8.430,976  0,33  8.671,678  0,34 
2.1 FIXED ASSETS   2.881,327  0,12  3.192,710  0,10 3.439,619  0,11 3.815,819  0,12 3.820,319  0,15  4.050,621  0,16 
2.2 INTANGIBLE ASSETS   3.939,557  0,17  4.438,295  0,15 4.833,520  0,15 4.634,357  0,14 4.610,657  0,18  4.621,057  0,18 
3  Uncalled up share capital  750.000,000  31,47  626.375,000  20,59 625.050,000  19,67 500.000,000  15,10 375.000,000  14,71  500.000,000  19,69 
  TOTAL ASSETS  2.382.948,337  100,00  3.041.770,399  100,00 3.177.254,414  100,00 3.311.247,818  100,00 2.550.015,065  100,00  2.538.900,636  100,00 
  LIABILITIES  30/06/1846
46  %  31/12/1846  %  30/06/1847  %  31/12/1847  %  30/06/1848  %  31/12/1848  % 
  Payable  1.360.386,737  57,09 2.006.411,531  65,96 2.121.414,222  66,77 2.238.188,722  67,59 1.502.844,978  58,93 1.485.799,232  58,52 
4  Current liabilities  990.154,890  41,55 1.604.850,732  52,76 1.710.708,621  53,84 1.928.814,828  58,25 1.251.533,750  49,08 1.318.685,481  51,94 
4.1 BANK NOTES ISSUED  541.000,000  22,70  1.000.000,000  32,88 1.160.000,000  36,51 1.492.500,000  45,07 1.097.500,000  43,04  1.097.500,000  43,23 
4.2 CURRENT ACCOUNTS  297.524,707  12,49  573.009,743  18,84 527.716,713  16,61 406.719,224  12,28 151.761,532  5,95  206.082,316  8,12 
4.3 PAYMENT COMMITMENTS  151.630,183  6,36  31.726,989  1,04 22.750,908  0,72 29.558,604  0,89 2.088,218  0,08  13.921,165  0,55 
4.4 COMMIT. TO SHAREHOLDERS    0,00  114,000  0,00 241,000  0,01 37,000  0,00 184,000  0,01  1.182,000  0,05 
5  Long-term liabilities  370.231,847  15,54  401.560,799  13,20 410.705,601  12,93 309.373,894  9,34 251.311,228  9,86  167.113,751  6,58 
5.1 DEPOSITS   370.231,847  15,54  401.560,799  13,20 410.705,601  12,93 309.373,894  9,34 251.311,228  9,86  167.113,751  6,58 
6  Owners’ equity  1.022.561,600  42,91  1.035.358,868  34,04 1.055.840,192  33,23 1.073.059,096  32,41 1.047.170,087  41,07  1.053.101,404  41,48 
6.1 PROFIT OR LOSS  22.561,600  0,95  30.104,192  0,99 43.560,050  1,37 51.567,045  1,56 31.191,477  1,22  28.977,165  1,14 
6.2 STATUTORY RESERVES    0,00  5.254,676  0,17 12.280,142  0,39 21.492,051  0,65 15.978,610  0,63  24.124,239  0,95 
6.3 UNDERWRITTEN CAPITAL   1.000.000,000  41,96  1.000.000,000  32,88 1.000.000,000  31,47 1.000.000,000  30,20 1.000.000,000  39,22  1.000.000,000  39,39 
  TOTAL LIABILITIES  2.382.948,337  100,00  3.041.770,399  100,00 3.177.254,414  100,00 3.311.247,818  100,00 2.550.015,065  100,00  2.538.900,636  100,00 
 
                                                 
44 Source: Half-yearly financial statements published by the Bank of Barcelona, 1846-1856. 
45 Refers to the first 10 months of activity, from 1 September 1845 to 30 June 1846 
46Refers to the first 10 months of activity, from 1 September 1845 to 30 June 1846  Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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  ASSETS   30/06/1849  %  31/12/1849  %  30/06/1850  %  31/12/1850  %  30/06/1851  %  31/12/1851  % 
1  Current Assets  2.088.290,065  76,73  2.105.678,862  73,51 2.587.922,307  77,33 2.791.076,964  78,61 3.283.264,865  81,21  3.227.383,795  80,96 
1.1 CASH ASSETS  968.516,839  35,58  915.358,430  31,95 1.464.661,634  43,77 1.538.345,992  43,33 1.569.871,456  38,83  1.896.590,471  47,57 
1.2 ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE  1.119.773,226  41,14  1.190.320,432  41,55 1.123.260,673  33,56 1.252.730,972  35,28 1.713.393,409  42,38  1.330.793,324  33,38 
2  Capital Assets  8.433,487  0,31  8.875,487  0,31 8.625,487  0,26 9.504,642  0,27 9.501,285  0,24  9.251,285  0,23 
2.1 FIXED ASSETS   3.940,884  0,14  3.815,884  0,13 3.690,884  0,11 3.923,240  0,11 3.957,258  0,10  3.832,258  0,10 
2.2 INTANGIBLE ASSETS   4.492,603  0,17  5.059,603  0,18 4.934,603  0,15 5.581,402  0,16 5.544,027  0,14  5.419,027  0,14 
3  Uncalled up share capital  625.000,000  22,96  750.000,000  26,18 750.000,000  22,41 750.000,000  21,12 750.000,000  18,55  750.000,000  18,81 




  LIABILITIES  30/06/1849  %  31/12/1849  %  30/06/1850  %  31/12/1850  %  30/06/1851  %  31/12/1851  % 
  Payable  1.670.654,572  61,38 1.814.689,046  63,35 2.307.492,211  68,95 2.503.404,712  70,51 2.992.693,335  74,03 2.934.055,701  73,60 
4  Current liabilities  1.486.938,060  54,63 1.604.296,516  56,01 2.044.212,478  61,08 2.274.904,504  64,07 2.776.712,845  68,68 2.603.235,749  65,30 
4.1 BANK NOTES ISSUED  886.430,000  32,57  661.280,000  23,08 490.490,000  14,66 471.140,000  13,27 452.130,000  11,18  422.230,000  10,59 
4.2 CURRENT ACCOUNTS  570.304,155  20,95  876.201,083  30,59 1.348.660,768  40,30 1.595.191,816  44,93 1.968.777,272  48,70  1.879.169,259  47,14 
4.3 PAYMENT COMMITMENTS  27.006,905  0,99  47.861,433  1,67 199.575,710  5,96 202.453,188  5,70 351.076,073  8,68  296.930,990  7,45 
4.4 COMMIT. TO SHAREHOLDERS  3.197,000  0,12  18.954,000  0,66 5.486,000  0,16 6.119,500  0,17 4.729,500  0,12  4.905,500  0,12 
5  Long-term liabilities  183.716,512  6,75  210.392,530  7,34 263.279,733  7,87 228.500,208  6,44 215.980,490  5,34  330.819,952  8,30 
5.1 DEPOSITS   183.716,512  6,75  210.392,530  7,34 263.279,733  7,87 228.500,208  6,44 215.980,490  5,34  330.819,952  8,30 
6  Owners’ equity  1.051.068,980  38,62  1.049.865,303  36,65 1.039.055,583  31,05 1.047.176,894  29,49 1.050.072,815  25,97  1.052.579,379  26,40 
6.1 PROFIT OR LOSS  20.391,643  0,75  19.187,966  0,67 14.055,583  0,42 22.176,894  0,62 25.072,815  0,62  27.579,379  0,69 
6.2 STATUTORY RESERVES  30.677,337  1,13  30.677,337  1,07 25.000,000  0,75 25.000,000  0,70 25.000,000  0,62  25.000,000  0,63 
6.3 UNDERWRITTEN CAPITAL   1.000.000,000  36,74  1.000.000,000  34,91 1.000.000,000  29,88 1.000.000,000  28,16 1.000.000,000  24,74  1.000.000,000  25,08 
  TOTAL LIABILITIES  2.721.723,552  100,00  2.864.554,349  100,00 3.346.547,794  100,00 3.550.581,606  100,00 4.042.766,150  100,00  3.986.635,080  100,00 Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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  ASSETS   30/06/1852  %  31/12/1852  %  30/06/1853  %  31/12/1853  %  30/06/1854  %  31/12/1854  % 
1  Current Assets  4.787.310,517  86,32  4.330.550,420  85,09 4.561.122,137  85,74 4.031.291,783  84,17 4.065.195,024  84,28  3.885.183,443  83,68 
1.1 CASH ASSETS  3.640.817,224  65,64  2.427.118,909  47,69 3.150.843,345  59,23 2.317.777,875  48,39 2.279.505,924  47,26  1.665.253,612  35,87 
1.2 ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE  1.146.493,293  20,67  1.903.431,511  37,40 1.410.278,792  26,51 1.713.513,908  35,78 1.785.689,100  37,02  2.219.929,831  47,82 
2  Capital Assets  9.001,285  0,16  8.751,285  0,17 8.501,285  0,16 8.251,285  0,17 8.001,285  0,17  7.501,035  0,16 
2.1 FIXED ASSETS   3.707,258  0,07  3.582,258  0,07 3.457,258  0,06 3.332,258  0,07 3.207,258  0,07  2.832,008  0,06 
2.2 INTANGIBLE ASSETS   5.294,027  0,10  5.169,027  0,10 5.044,027  0,09 4.919,027  0,10 4.794,027  0,10  4.669,027  0,10 
3  Uncalled up share capital  750.000,000  13,52  750.000,000  14,74 750.000,000  14,10 750.000,000  15,66 750.000,000  15,55  750.000,000  16,15 
  TOTAL ASSETS  5.546.311,802  100,00  5.089.301,705  100,00 5.319.623,422  100,00 4.789.543,068  100,00 4.823.196,309  100,00  4.642.684,478  100,00 
 
 
  LIABILITIES  30/06/1852  %  31/12/1852  %  30/06/1853  %  31/12/1853  %  30/06/1854  %  31/12/1854  % 
  Payable  4.503.834,133  81,20 4.036.664,094  79,32 4.270.343,911  80,28 3.734.310,008  77,97 3.763.936,657  78,04 3.576.748,466  77,04 
4  Current liabilities  4.176.565,886  75,30 3.787.495,381  74,42 3.941.784,173  74,10 3.343.669,246  69,81 3.547.260,846  73,55 3.295.066,705  70,97 
4.1 BANK NOTES ISSUED  342.690,000  6,18  265.740,000  5,22 250.000,000  4,70 250.000,000  5,22 250.000,000  5,18  250.000,000  5,38 
4.2 CURRENT ACCOUNTS  3.489.242,152  62,91  3.247.698,765  63,81 3.384.484,832  63,62 2.843.978,898  59,38 3.078.963,255  63,84  2.982.866,751  64,25 
4.3 PAYMENT COMMITMENTS  340.196,234  6,13  269.674,866  5,30 303.888,091  5,71 247.467,848  5,17 216.644,341  4,49  58.307,204  1,26 
4.4 COMMIT. TO SHAREHOLDERS  4.437,500  0,08  4.381,750  0,09 3.411,250  0,06 2.222,500  0,05 1.653,250  0,03  3.892,750  0,08 
5  Long-term liabilities  327.268,247  5,90  249.168,713  4,90 328.559,738  6,18 390.640,762  8,16 216.675,811  4,49  281.681,761  6,07 
5.1 DEPOSITS   327.268,247  5,90  249.168,713  4,90 328.559,738  6,18 390.640,762  8,16 216.675,811  4,49  281.681,761  6,07 
6  Owners’ equity  1.042.477,669  18,80  1.052.637,611  20,68 1.049.279,511  19,72 1.055.233,060  22,03 1.059.259,652  21,96  1.065.936,012  22,96 
6.1 PROFIT OR LOSS  17.477,669  0,32  27.637,611  0,54 24.279,511  0,46 30.233,060  0,63 34.259,652  0,71  40.936,012  0,88 
6.2 STATUTORY RESERVES  25.000,000  0,45  25.000,000  0,49 25.000,000  0,47 25.000,000  0,52 25.000,000  0,52  25.000,000  0,54 
6.3 UNDERWRITTEN CAPITAL   1.000.000,000  18,03  1.000.000,000  19,65 1.000.000,000  18,80 1.000.000,000  20,88 1.000.000,000  20,73  1.000.000,000  21,54 
  TOTAL LIABILITIES  5.546.311,802  100,00  5.089.301,705  100,00 5.319.623,422  100,00 4.789.543,068  100,00 4.823.196,309  100,00  4.642.684,478  100,00 
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  ASSETS   30/06/1855  %  31/12/1855  %  30/06/1856  %  31/12/1856  % 
1  Current Assets  4.158.931,341  78,51  4.752.403,871  75,03 6.050.307,943  80,05 4.197.428,657  55,37
1.1 CASH ASSETS  2.222.702,327  41,96  2.784.185,164  43,95 3.701.572,015  48,97 1.433.916,997  18,92
1.2 ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE  1.936.229,014  36,55  1.968.218,707  31,07 2.348.735,928  31,08 2.763.511,660  36,46
2  Capital Assets  7.251,035  0,14  7.001,035  0,11 7.927,141  0,10 132.654,224  1,75
2.1 FIXED ASSETS   2.707,008  0,05  2.582,008  0,04 3.633,114  0,05 128.485,197  1,70
2.2 INTANGIBLE ASSETS   4.544,027  0,09  4.419,027  0,07 4.294,027  0,06 4.169,027  0,05
3  Uncalled up share capital  1.131.090,000  21,35  1.575.000,000  24,86 1.500.000,000  19,85 3.250.000,000  42,88
  TOTAL ASSETS  5.297.272,376  100,00  6.334.404,906  100,00 7.558.235,084  100,00 7.580.082,881  100,00
 
 
  LIABILITIES  30/06/1855  %  31/12/1855  %  30/06/1856  %  31/12/1856  % 
  Payable  3.729.217,492  70,40 4.263.481,159  67,31 5.469.166,893  72,36 3.488.160,441  46,02
4  Current liabilities  3.480.763,052  65,71 4.052.218,795  63,97 5.218.497,279  69,04 3.329.420,831  43,92
4.1 BANK NOTES ISSUED  250.000,000  4,72  527.850,000  8,33 1.000.000,000  13,23 1.400.000,000  18,47
4.2 CURRENT ACCOUNTS  3.228.336,937  60,94  3.521.516,244  55,59 3.801.979,941  50,30 1.863.494,996  24,58
4.3 PAYMENT COMMITMENTS  771,615  0,01  485,519  0,01 414.584,398  5,49 64.389,479  0,85
4.4 COMMIT. TO SHAREHOLDERS  1.654,500  0,03  2.367,032  0,04 1.932,940  0,03 1.536,356  0,02
5  Long-term liabilities  248.454,440  4,69  211.262,364  3,34 250.669,614  3,32 158.739,610  2,09
5.1 DEPOSITS   248.454,440  4,69  211.262,364  3,34 250.669,614  3,32 158.739,610  2,09
6  Owners’ equity  1.568.054,884  29,60  2.070.923,747  32,69 2.089.068,191  27,64 4.091.922,440  53,98
6.1 PROFIT OR LOSS  43.054,884  0,81  43.064,044  0,68 54.881,387  0,73 52.935,807  0,70
6.2 STATUTORY RESERVES  25.000,000  0,47  27.859,703  0,44 34.186,804  0,45 38.986,633  0,51
6.3 UNDERWRITTEN CAPITAL   1.500.000,000  28,32  2.000.000,000  31,57 2.000.000,000  26,46 4.000.000,000  52,77
  TOTAL LIABILITIES  5.297.272,376  100,00  6.334.404,906  100,00 7.558.235,084  100,00 7.580.082,881  100,00
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TABLE 2.2: PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT (data in DUROS) 
 
6.1  PROFIT AND LOSS   30/06/1846
47  %  31/12/1846  %  30/06/1847  %  31/12/1847  %  30/06/1848  %  31/12/1848  % 
A  Income  33.068,740    41.019,324    51.396,646    60.988,648    41.400,287    37.926,623   
B  Expenditure  10.507,140  100,00  10.915,132  100,00  7.836,596  100,00  9.421,603  100,00  10.208,810  100,00  8.949,458  100,00 
1 PAYMENT OF INTEREST & COMMISSIONS  582,679  5,55  3.424,004  31,37  1.037,878  13,24  406,888  4,32  677,619  6,64  189,083  2,11 
2 PERSONNEL COSTS  8.113,670  77,22  6.154,493  56,38  5.385,993  68,73  7.228,496  76,72  6.348,102  62,18  5.992,007  66,95 
3 ENDOWMENT AMORTIZATION ASSETS  250,000  2,38  250,000  2,29  250,000  3,19  250,000  2,65  250,000  2,45  250,000  2,79 
4 OTHER OPERATING COSTS  1.560,791  14,85  1.086,635  9,96  1.162,725  14,84  1.536,219  16,31  2.933,089  28,73  2.518,368  28,14 
A-B  PROFITS   22.561,600    30.104,192    43.560,050    51.567,045    31.191,477    28.977,165   
 
6.1  PROFIT AND LOSS   30/06/1849  %  31/12/1849  %  30/06/1850  %  31/12/1850  %  30/06/1851  %  31/12/1851  % 
A  Income  29.043,385    26.378,911    22.401,510    29.435,695    32.090,119    35.230,221   
B  Expenditure  8.651,742  100,00  7.190,945  100,00  8.345,927  100,00  7.258,801  100,00  7.017,304  100,00  7.650,842  100,00 
1 PAYMENT OF INTEREST & COMMISSIONS  120,286  1,39  148,572  2,07  111,758  1,34  250,702  3,45  253,956  3,62  275,167  3,60 
2 PERSONNEL COSTS  5.429,567  62,76  5.377,251  74,78  5.125,066  61,41  5.677,321  78,21  5.669,330  80,79  5.686,598  74,33 
3 ENDOWMENT AMORTIZATION ASSETS  250,000  2,89  250,000  3,48  250,000  3,00  250,000  3,44  250,000  3,56  250,000  3,27 
4 OTHER OPERATING COSTS  2.851,889  32,96  1.415,122  19,68  2.859,103  34,26  1.080,778  14,89  844,018  12,03  1.439,077  18,81 
A-B  PROFITS   20.391,643    19.187,966    14.055,583    22.176,894    25.072,815    27.579,379   
 
6.1  PROFIT AND LOSS   30/06/1852  %  31/12/1852  %  30/06/1853  %  31/12/1853  %  30/06/1854  %  31/12/1854  % 
A  Income  25.586,130    35.914,034    32.381,427    38.797,211    42.561,399    50.151,328   
B  Expenditure  8.108,461  100,00  8.276,423  100,00  8.101,916  100,00  8.564,151  100,00  8.301,747  100,00  9.215,316  100,00 
1 PAYMENT OF INTEREST & COMMISSIONS  271,366  3,35  495,111  5,98  229,225  2,83  246,603  2,88  241,406  2,91  308,381  3,35 
2 PERSONNEL COSTS  5.824,720  71,84  6.290,558  76,01  6.246,409  77,10  6.060,769  70,77  5.833,916  70,27  6.820,651  74,01 
3 ENDOWMENT AMORTIZATION ASSETS  250,000  3,08  250,000  3,02  250,000  3,09  250,000  2,92  250,000  3,01  250,000  2,71 
4 OTHER OPERATING COSTS  1.762,375  21,74  1.240,754  14,99  1.376,282  16,99  2.006,779  23,43  1.976,425  23,81  1.836,284  19,93 
A-B  PROFITS   17.477,669    27.637,611    24.279,511    30.233,060    34.259,652    40.936,012   
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6.1  PROFIT AND LOSS   30/06/1855  %  31/12/1855  %  30/06/1856  %  31/12/1856  % 
A  Income  52.171,160    53.176,362    65.947,512    69.647,978   
B  Expenditure  9.116,276  100,00  10.112,318  100,00  11.066,125  100,00  16.712,171  100,00 
1 PAYMENT OF INTEREST & COMMISSIONS  175,158  1,92  251,480  2,49  849,332  7,68  1.583,391  9,47 
2 PERSONNEL COSTS  6.715,604  73,67  7.420,639  73,38  7.780,519  70,31  8.386,069  50,18 
3 ENDOWMENT AMORTIZATION ASSETS  250,000  2,74  250,000  2,47  250,000  2,26  250,000  1,50 
4 OTHER OPERATING COSTS  1.975,514  21,67  2.190,199  21,66  2.186,274  19,76  6.492,711  38,85 
A-B  PROFITS   43.054,884    43.064,044    54.881,387    52.935,807   Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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APPENDIX 2: Report from the Board of Directors of the Bank of Barcelona on the capital 
increase of 4 December 1854. 
 
The simultaneous decrease in cash assets and increase in the portfolio, coinciding with the 
almost stationary permanence of obligations paid at sight, demonstrate the fundamental and 
even urgent need to place the bank in a position where it may avoid, under critical 
circumstances, in an attack of panic, the undesirable situation of possessing an overly inflated 
portfolio and the not unlikely danger, in respect of this, that if a part of the portfolio superior 
to the value of disbursed capital were to prove impossible to collect, the current guarantee in 
the hands of the shareholders might  prove insufficient.  
The B oard of Directors feel that there are three measures to be implemented in order to 
achieve the above objective.    
1.  System of contraction, based on reducing credit, raising factoring rates, limiting 
consignments and increasing loan guarantees. 
2.  Exaction of passive dividends. 
3.  Increase of capital.  
Let us examine them. 
The first measure provides positive, although slow, results. However, in its origin and trends, 
its application would upset and disturb commercial transactions on the market, would give 
rise to complaints and demands which would lay open either the imprecision and hesitant 
approach of the bank, or the insufficiency of its current resources to meet the objectives of its 
foundation.   
While the burden involved in the second measure, somewhat opposed in spirit to Article 14 of 
the statutes, does suppose an increase in resources, providing the greatest shareholder 
disbursement, it does not carry with it, however, a real and positive increase in guarantee 
since the capital of one million  duros would not be modified in its totality. Being 
recommendable in this case the prudent action of reducing the portfolio, the securities of 
which amount to approximately double that sum, herein lies the inefficiency and inopportune 
nature of this second measure.        
The management believes it risks nothing in stating that the third measure is the only one 
which meets all the desired criteria without suffering from any of the drawbacks expressed 
above. Indeed, on top of the greater guarantee which the issuance of new shares would 
represent, an increase in disbursed capital would be achieved, without going beyond the 
limits of prudence, by demanding twenty-five percent of their nominal capital in order to level 
them with the original shares. Far from reducing the portfolio, its amount could be raised to 
two million duros with no risk or harm done to the shareholders. Finally, the bank will remain 
solidly constituted, without great loss of half-yearly profits, which will necessarily be reduced 
to a reasonable proportion if fuel is not to be fed to rivals and competitors.    
One objection could perhaps be lodged against the appropriateness of increasing the capital 
of the bank, which is the impossibility of later reducing it to its original state in the event of a 
widespread commercial standstill and the subsequent decrease in the portfolio. The 
management does not hesitate to qualify such an argument as weak, since if the data here 
exposed did not shed sufficient light on the matter, related as it is to a short period of time, it 
would be enough to study the upward trend of the portfolio since the opening of the bank.    Yolanda Blasco Martel y Pilar Nogués Marco: The Accounting Mirror                  
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The surprise, and even distrust, with which the novelty of any institution is greeted, however 
useful that institution may be, ignorance of the theories of credit and their huge advantages, 
routine and limited business sense, all contributed to deprive the institution initially of the 
basic sustenance which a bank in the capital of the kingdom needs. This initial hesitancy 
overcome and following the gradual a cclimatisation, so to speak, of the institution, the 
business community gradually overcame its distrust and began to accustom itself to the 
granting and circulating of fixed-term promissory notes. Businessmen now approach the bank 
without embarrassment in search of help, on the security of which they count in order to 
satisfy the spirit of speculation which has been engendered under the tutelage of the 
establishment. Every day new companies of service to the public are created, which by giving 
greater impetus to transactions increase public and private wealth and flow back to the bank 
itself increasing its portfolio.        
The management does not believe impossible, however, the presence of extraordinary causes, 
although transitory, such us a marked paralysis of business or an exaggerated influence of 
the working medium in the market, which hinder the development of the operations of the 
bank. However, it is convinced that even in the face of such circumstances, it would be within 
its power to halt the drop in portfolio, employing a series of measures and in the last instance 
reducing interest rates to 3%, in the extreme case of which, and supposing a portfolio of two 
million duros, the shareholders may still find themselves with substantial funds.  